4.4 Party Preference and Interaction Effects

A lack of interaction effects between cultural biases is one of the most characteristic traits of the Sequential Individual Approach. This is in contrast to synthesized individuals who use the cultural biases together, creating a clear interaction effect; and to coherent individuals, who have only one cultural bias so the question of interaction is irrelevant. It should be possible to detect the effects of interaction between the cultural biases in sequential individuals' party preferences. *Cultural Theory* present parties as regimes; i.e., coalitions between the possible ways of life. (*CT*, p.93). Following the logic of the theory, the respondents should be more likely to vote for a party that represents their preferred culture (in a given context). The cultural profiles for the main Norwegian parties have been made by Gunnar Grendstad (1995).

RV is an alliance of far-left parties. SV is a popular socialist party with an environmentalist and youth orientation. DNA is the Norwegian labor party, which has been the largest party in Norway for 50 years; it has developed a catchall profile. V is the local liberal party, with a long tradition but declining support. They have lately changed their profile to a more environmentalist direction. Sp is the agrarian party, with strong links to farmers. Sp is sometimes seen as environmentally conscious. Krf is a Christian democratic party, with a religious, conservative-values profile. H is the local conservative party, with a conservative-values and pro-market profile. Frp is a right-wing

party, with one fraction supporting economical liberalism and one supporting more populist politics.

4.4.1 Monocultural Bias and Party Preference

I will proceed here by first presenting the pure cultures and the tendencies towards preferring or rejecting a certain party, and then examining the bicultural categories in relation to the pure cultures. The diagrams show the adjusted residuals for each cell formed by combining the cultural category and its voting preference[17]. Thus, if the residual for pure Hierarchy and RV is -0.9, this is to be interpreted as: Having a hierarchical cultural preference reduces the respondent's chance for voting for RV. The size of the residual tells us that the deviation from the expected value is 0.9 adjusted residuals lower than the expected value for RV preference.[18] In the calculation of these residuals, I have excluded the respondents voting for "other parties" in order to achieve a theoretically more stringent analysis.

[17] All figures in the following discussion are based on one table that can be found in the appendix on page 215.

[18] Standardized residuals deviations are influenced by the size of the absolute residual, but not by the uneven distributions in either columns or rows, so that it is possible to interpret the adjusted residual as correcting for the uneven distribution of respondents, especially when the number of respondents in a cell is small. It would be difficult to compare the standardized residuals for RV and DNA with each other because of the different share of the respondents voting for them.

The pure cultures have distinctive voting preferences, which fits well with my expectations based on knowledge of the Norwegian parties profiles. In Figure 4.5 we can see that the **hierarchical** group displays a clear tendency to prefer Krf, SP and H. Krf is the Christian party, and it advocates the restoration of traditional values, i.e. recreation of order in society. H is a conservative values party, and naturally scores positively here. Surprisingly, Sp scores higher than H, perhaps their electorate is more traditionally oriented than the image the party wants to give of itself. The fact that Venstre, the liberal party scores positively here, is even more surprising. The parties scoring lowest on Hierarchy are SV and RV, who both, to a degree, attack the establishment and try to profile themselves as critics of the society, which attitude obviously does not correspond with a hierarchical cultural bias. Frp also scores very low, perhaps a result of their dislike of state regulations. Frp could have scored very differently, since they are a law-and-order party when it comes to criminality[19].



Figure 4.5 Mono-Hierarhcy and Party Preference in Adj.Res.

[19] This shows how the expectations connected with the parties are still somewhat unclear, and how I therefore can bend the theory to fit my findings.

The **individualistic** group has only two disproportionally preferred parties, H and Frp, both right-wing parties. For me, it is surprising that Høyre scores higher than Frp, since Frp has been arguing for fewer rules, and for shrinking of the public bureaucracy, whereas Høyre is associated with the establishment and conservative value. Perhaps it is H's economical liberalism that gives them a high score on Individualism. For all other parties, and especially for SV, there is a tendency to receive less votes than expected if there were no relation between Individualism and party preference.



Figure 4.6 Mono-Individualism and Party Preferances in Adj.res.

The **Egalitarian** group first and foremost prefers SV, and then DNA and RV. The tendency is very strong, the actual frequency for SV deviates 7.9 adj. residuals from the expected frequency.

The egalitarian cultural bias does not influence the preference for the other parties much, with the exception of H and Frp, which are much less preferred than expected if there were no relation between party preference and Egalitarianism. There is also a tendency for less Don't Know and more Won't Vote preferences.



Figure 4.7 Mono-Egalitarianism and Party Preference in Adj.Res.

The **fatalistic** group has a strong tendency towards non-voting, or to not know what to vote. This also fits the expectations. The only parties that get more votes than expected are Sp and V.

Both the left and right wing parties get fewer votes than expected. The non-voting tendency is so strong that it clearly warrants the continued use of



Figure 4.8 Mono-Fatalism and Party Preference in Adj.Res.

the Fatalism scale, especially since they are a poorly understood group in political science.

To summarize, the voting patterns for the different monocultural groups do in general fit well with the parties' ideological profiles. This is encouraging, given the uncertainties involved with a new type of operationalization. My confidence in the **operationalization** and measurement procedures is greatly enforced. This should make it possible to use cultural theory for more practical political applications. One should also note that **the effect of the cultural biases is two-fold**: it leads both to increased support for the parties which have an ideological profile similar to one's cultural bias, and to a decreased support for the parties that are in opposition to one's cultural bias.

4.4.2 The Lack of Interaction Effects

The Sequential Individual's assumptions are supported by the the results above, and the Coherent Individual would also have fit well to them. The results here seem to confirm the operationalization of the variables used. In order to actually **challenge** the Sequential Individual's assumptions, I need to see how individuals who support two cultural biases differ in their party preferences from those who support only one cultural bias. If the respondents' preferences are as the Sequential Individual Approach claims, I should always find that the effects for the bicultural biases are in between the effects for their two respective monocultural groups. The crucial cases are those bicultural individuals whose voting preference cannot be said to be based on either of the pure cultures. These respondents are found in Table 4.5 in several different combinations

(marked with a darker color). The first contradictory case is when each of the two monocultural biases effect party preference in the same direction while the bicultural group's effect is in the opposite direction; a tendency that cannot result from relying on either of the pure cultures. The second contradictory case is when each of the two monocultural biases have a moderate effect in the same direction, and the bicultural group has a considerably stronger effect in the same direction; a tendency that indicates an additive effect (i.e., the Synthetic Individual Approach). The third contradictory case is when the two monocultural biases have moderate effects in opposite directions, and the bicultural bias has a strong effect in either direction. This is also a tendency that cannot be caused by either of the two monocultural biases.

The bicultural bias' effect is ... in relation to the two monocultural.	The two monocultural biases effects are in: Same direction	The two monocultural biases effects are in: Opposite Directions
opposite	**(Something new)** **Not Sequential** Not Synthetic	not a logical possibility
Less of the same	Not Sequential Not Synthetic	
between	**Sequential** Not Synthetic	**Synthetic** (mean within individual) **Sequential** (mean of individuals)
Outside the range / More of the same	(Additive) **Not Sequential** Synthetic	(Something new) Not Sequential Not Synthetic

Table 4.5 Different Relations between Mono- and Bicultural Biases' Effects. Relations Weakening Sequential Individual Approach Marked with Dark.

Table 4.5 describes all the possible relations between the monocultural biases and the bicultural bias formed from them. On the top in the table are the different relations the two monocultural biases can have when combined; they either effect party preference in the same or the opposite direction.[20] In the column to the left are specified the four different possible relations between the effects of bicultural bias and the two monocultural biases. Some examples help to clarify the table. If I compare the

[20] It is possible to imagine a situation where they do not have an effect at all, but since this is rather uninteresting I have left it out from the table.

effects hierarchical and individualistic cultural biases (both monocultural) have on preferring H, we see in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 that individualists vote more for H than expected, and that hierarchists vote much more for H than expected. Thus, both cultural biases have an effect in the same direction on H preference; they raise the possibility of H preference. The question I am interested in is: What kind of effect does the sequential combination of Hierarchy and Individualism (bi-HI) have on the H preference? Is the effect in the same direction as the monocultural biases' effects?

If the effect is **stronger** than either of the monocultural biases' effects (more of the same), the effect is likely to be additive. This kind of additive effect should be found in the Synthetic Individual Approach, not in the Sequential Individual. If the effect of the bicultural biases is **in between** the two monocultural biases' effects (i.e., in the same range - weak, moderate, or strong - as the two monocultural biases), it could be caused by the mechanisms described in the Sequential Individual. If the effect of the bicultural bias is in the **opposite** direction, it cannot be caused by the mechanisms described in Sequential Individual, and probably not by the Synthesized Individual, either. The Synthesized Individual assumes interaction effects, but they should be additive (the individuals' preference should resemble the sum of the effects of her cultural biases). A strong non-additive interaction effect would mean that the individual is more - and perhaps something else - than the sum of the parts.

It is also possible that the two monocultural biases have opposite effects, which would make it impossible to separate the effects of the Sequential Individual and the Synthesized Individual from each other. If, in this situation, the strength of the bicultural bias' effect is clearly outside the range of the monocultural biases' effects, it cannot be

explained by either the Sequential or Synthetic Individual Approaches. In that case the effect of the bicultural bias is having a new strength and/or direction that is not a result of either monocultural biases or the sum of the monocultural biases. If the strength of the bicultural bias' effect is between the two monocultural biases' effects, it could be caused by processes described in either the Synthetic or Sequential Individual Approaches, but in this situation we cannot separate the Sequential Individual's effect from the Synthetic Individual's effect. Both approaches would predict that the bicultural bias' effect is in between the two monocultural biases' effects; Sequential Individual because the mean of the effects across all individuals should be between the two monocultural (individuals would be using either the one or the other of the two monocultural biases); Synthesized Individual because the effect of bicultural bias in each individual would be the mean of the two monocultural biases' effects taken within the individual.

Now that I have presented what kind of effects the mono- and bicultural biases should have, it is time to look at the empirical material.

4.4.3 Bicultural Biases and Party Preference

I will in the following go through the bicultural groups and compare each of them with the two corresponding monocultural groups. For each of these figures there are two aspects I will focus on: First, what kind of effect does the bicultural bias have on party preferences? Second, how does this relate to the effects of the comparable monocultural groups on the same party; i.e., do we have a pattern that confirms to the expectations in the Sequential Individual Approach (as presented in Table 4.5)?

The Sequential Individual Approach implies that there are no additive relations between the cultural biases, and I am trying to investigate that assumption through an analysis of structures in the data. Table 4.5 presents the different relations between mono- and bicultural biases' effects on party preferences. In the following discussion I will identify these relations in the figures. I will here focus only on the relationship between the bicultural groups and the monocultural groups, since I have already discussed the voting preferences for the monocultural groups. The cases in this analysis are thus combinations of tendencies to prefer a party for respondents who share biases, for example, mono-H, mono-I and bi-HI cultural respondents tendency to support RV in Figure 4.9. In other words in Figure 4.9 are 10 cases than can be analysed for their internal relations (or structure).



Figure 4.9 Hierarchy or Individualism and Party Preference

The bicultural Hierarchy-Individualism group (bi-HI), presented as the line in Figure 4.9[21], is close to both Hierarchy and Individualism for RV and for Don't Know. For SV, Sp, V, Krf, and H the bi-HI deviation from expected is between Hierarchy's and Individualism's deviation[22]. All these patterns fit the Sequential Individual assumptions. There are, though, several residuals that do not fit the assumptions; bi-HI is outside the range of the monocultural groups deviation for DNA and Frp, and for the group Won't Vote the bicultural effect is opposite from the monocultural. To sum up, of the ten possible preferences, seven fit the pattern described by the Sequential Individual and three do not.

[21] In the following figures the line represents the bicultural combination and the bars represent the monocultural biases. Bicultural bias imply support for two biases, but only one at the time, therefore I have labeled the figures using 'or', instead of 'and' between the two biases.

[22] All figures in this section use adjusted residuals, which is a standardized measure for deviation from expected cell frequency. All figures are a presentation of one table, which is included in Appendix page 215. For a explanation of the adjusted residual as a measure see note on page 86.

The bicultural Hierarchy-Egalitarianism (bi-HE) combination seems to be between the pure Hierarchy and pure Egalitarianism for RV, SV, DNA, Sp, H, and Frp (Figure 4.10). It clearly deviates from the expectations given in the Sequential Individual version of the theory for V, Don't Know and Won't voters. For DNA the effect of the combination is close to the effect of pure Egalitarianism, and when pure Hierarchy does not have an effect at all this seems to point more towards the Synthetic Individual than towards the Sequential Individual. The social-democratic party is known for its redistributive politics, for its trust in experts' knowledge and for its emphasis on rules and regulations. This combination fits well for the people who support both Egalitarianism and Hierarchy. The bi-HE group also has a tendency to have more people who do not know what to prefer and less people who would not vote than supporters of either Hierarchy or Egalitarianism. RV seems to not be favored by the bi-HE group, who vote less on RV than expected. This is similar to the hierarchists' vote for RV, whereas egalitarians show a clear tendency to vote for RV. The pure egalitarians' strong tendency to prefer SV does not influence the bi-HE combination's preference to the degree I expected. From these results we learn that the parties benefiting from the bi-HE combination are DNA and Krf, and the parties which are



Figure 4.10 Hierarchy or Egalitarianism and Party Preference

negatively effected are particularly H, and to some degree SV, RV, and Frp. Of the ten possible combinations, seven behave as described by the Sequential Individual Approach.

There are very few individuals who support the combination of Fatalism and Hierarchy, but if we look at their voting preferences (Figure 4.11), we can see that the party which most profits from this combination is Krf, and that also Sp and Frp show a positive tendency. For all the other parties the effect is either minor or negative. The clearest negative tendency is the vote for SV and H. There are three preferences that do not follow the pattern described by the Sequential Individual Approach: H and Don't Know, for whom the effect is on the outside of the range; and Frp, for whom the effect is opposite from the monocultural bias' effect. As expected the bi-HF bias increases the tendency to not vote, but less than the pure Fatalism bias. Thus, there are three patterns out of ten that do not fit with the Sequential Individual Approach.



Figure 4.11 Hierarchy or Fatalism and Party Preference

For the respondents who support Individualism or Egalitarianism (bi-IE), there are some clear - even if not as strong - tendencies, as we have already seen. Preferences profiting from the combination are RV, DNA, H and the Don't Know. Again the majority of patterns fit the sequential assumption; Only Sp and Don't Know do not conform. For the bi-IE group there is a tendency to have more people with Don't Know and less people with SP preference.



Figure 4.12 Individualism or Egalitarianism and Party Preference

In the respondents who support either Individualism or Fatalism (bi-IF) there is a clear and disproportional tendency to support H, Frp or Sp. Parties who receive considerably less support are SV and Krf. There is also a slight tendency towards fewer respondents in the Don't Know group. There are only two patterns that deviate from the one predicted by the Sequential Individual: Sp and Don't Know. For Sp the effect of bi-IF is outside the range of both pure biases, and in the



Figure 4.13 Individualism or Fatalism and Party Preferance

opposite direction from the effect from Individualism.

For the respondents who support either Egalitarianism or Fatalism there are clearly positive tendencies; they prefer far left-wing, or they Don't Know whom to vote for, at least compared with the expected response. There are also some clear negative tendencies; H, DNA, Krf and V are receiving less support than expected. At least four of the patterns differ from the ones described by the Sequential Individual; DNA, V, Frp and Krf (RV and Don't Know are borderline cases).



Figure 4.14 Egalitarianism or Fatalism and Party Preference

		The two monocultural biases effects are in			
		Same direction	n	Opposite Directions	n
The bicultural bias' effect is ... in relation to the two monocultural.	opposite	**Not Sequential** Not Synthetic	2	not a logical possibility	
	Less of the same	Not Sequential Not Synthetic	1		
	between	**Sequential** Not Synthetic	17	**Synthetic Sequential**	16
	More of the same / Outside the range	Additive: **Not Sequential** Synthetic	3	Not Sequential Not Synthetic	9

Table 4.6 Different Relations between Mono- and Bicultural Biases' Effects. Frequensies Calculated from Figures 4.9 to 4.14 . RV and V Are Excluded.

To **summarize**, there are more cases that can be explained by the Sequential Individual assumption than there are cases that cannot (Table 4.6)[23]. In 33 out of 48 cases I found relations that could have been created by the Sequential Individual; only 15 could not be. This can be interpreted in several ways. First, to be correct almost two-thirds of the time is very good. Second, the rule used to determine what fits to the Sequential Individual and what does not is very favorable to the Sequential Individual; if so, having so many unexplainable patterns represents a problem. Third, I have incorrectly specified the effects of the sequential cultural bias (on page 114).

[23] I have excluded RV and V from this final comparison because they have very few supporters. Even if adjusted residuals do take this into account, the random processes of sampling will always create some random variation. In the graphs it is possible to evaluate them as they are, but in the table, all parties are equal, even if they should not be. The conclusion would not change even if RV and V were included.

4.4.4 Tendency Towards Confusion for the Multi-Biased Respondents

Cultural theory uses biases as a shortcut for opinions. One effect of this is the tendency towards non-opinion, or confusion, for the respondents who have several cultural biases. If the respondents switch biases as described by the Sequential Individual Approach there should be no source of confusion, because all contexts are kept separate from each other; thus, in every situation there is a clear bias to follow[24]. Both Don't Know and Won't Vote can be seen as indicating confusion. Since there should not be any confusion in the Sequential Individual, there should not be any significant difference in the tendency to vote or not to vote among the respondents with a high or low number of cultural biases.

[24] Or said in other words, there is no interaction effect between the cultural biases supported by the individual.

In Figure 4.15 we see what kind of effect of the number of cultural biases has on probability of voting. Because age is also an important factor in explaining voting frequency, I have included age in the analysis. It is easy to see that the probability to vote decreases somewhat with increasing number of cultures. The effect is small, but clearly significant and in the same magnitude as the effect of age, even when controlled for a number of other variables[25] . Since the number of cultures has an effect on the probability of voting, it seems to



Figure 4.15 Probability of Voting for Number of Cultural Biases and 6 Age Groups.

[25] The graph is based on following logit analysis:

Dependent Variable.. VOTER_D The voters vs. non-voters

-2 Log Likelihood	613,673
Goodness of Fit	650,456

	Chi-Square	df	Significance
Model Chi-Square	19,64	2	,00

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
CULTB_NR	-,34	,12	8,00	1	,00	-,10	,71
EDUCYEAR	,10	,04	6,66	1	,01	,09	1,10
AGE	,03	,01	16,19	1	,00	,15	1,03
Constant	-,30	,67	,20	1	,65		

I have also controlled for variables like gender, personal income, living in a city, and social position, but the effects have been neither substantially nor statistically significant.

indicate that there are interaction effects between the different cultural biases. It is, though, possible to imagine that my assumptions for the last discussion are not valid. Perhaps having several cultural biases lead to less clear opinions and less voting. I believe, though, that if one allows for this, we are already moving over to the domain of the Synthetic Individual.

4.5 Summary

There seems to be empirical evidence both for and against the Sequential Individual Approach. I was able to place the respondents into 15 groups defined by one to four cultural biases, and the sizes of these groups varied from 2.6% to 21.3% of the sample. Most of the groups were fairly equal in size (around 5%). This can be interpreted as the result of an equal spread of the cultural biases. These results could be partly created by my standardization of the original variables. A more serious problem is the way the data is collected; I must assume that the interview situation is at least partly independent from any specific context, so that the respondents can give answers that are at least partly valid in other contexts and other cultural biases. If the respondents' answers are only valid for the situation they are in, my interpretations of the results are misleading. But in this case the whole field of survey research would need to be rewritten.

Social background is clearly related to cultural bias and cultural bias combinations. Increasing age seems to go together with a tendency to prefer Hierarchy, and youth with a tendency to prefer Individualism or Egalitarianism. Age also has a very clear effect on the number of cultural biases a respondent supports. Respondents with four cultural biases have a mean age of 60 years and respondents with only one cultural bias have a

mean age of 37. Education has the opposite effect; increasing education seems to lead to a reduction in the number of cultural biases even when controlled for the effects of age. It is significant that age and education have opposite effects, and I suspect that they are sources of different types knowledge. Age can provide a chance to experience several cultural biases; whereas education is theoretical and most likely has a strong socializing effect on the prevailing cultural bias.

I attempted to show how social position effects cultural bias. Contrary to my expectations here, social position did not have a considerable effect on the number of cultural biases per respondents, when controlled for age and education. Social position is, though, a poor measure of context, and it is possible that better data with other variables would have given different results.

Party preference is clearly influenced by sequential individuals' cultural biases. In very many cases the patterns can be explained by the Sequential Individual Approach. There are also several cases that I believe will best be explained by the Synthesized Individual. My criteria for what should be considered as supporting the Sequential Individual was quite lenient, but I still found that almost a third of the patterns did not fit this approach. This indicates either a problem with the Sequential Individual Approach itself, or I have incorrectly specified the effects of multiple biases on voting; perhaps the Sequential Individual sometimes has additive effects.

FIGURES:

TABLES:

LIST OF CONTENT: