CHAPTER 3 : THE COHERENT INDIVIDUAL

In cultural theory individuals' relations to culture can be understood in several ways. In this chapter, the first of the three specifications - the Coherent Individual Approach - is under scrutiny. I will first restate the assumptions for the Coherent Individual Approach and then attempt to categorize the respondents after their cultural bias. I will then compare this categorization with a previous attempt by Grendstad to establish the sizes of the cultures, and next describe the social background of these coherent individuals by looking at their age, education and social position. I shall also analyze how well these cultural bias categories are able to describe and explain party preference, and compare my party preference estimates with Grendstad's party preference estimates.

3.1. Assumptions for the Coherent Individual Restated

The Coherent Individual version of cultural theory is based on the following set of assumptions. The individual meets a multiple set of contexts in her normal social interaction. Differences between the contexts can be best described by differences in the grid-group position. The individual, however, will internalize only one cultural bias that is based on the dominant grid-group positions she meets.

A situation with a mix of cultural biases can be found during a change from one culture to another. This change is explained by the theory of surprise, i.e., a situation where the expectations based on a cultural bias repeatedly are not fulfilled in the real world will lead to rejection of one's own cultural bias and a search for a new, better alternative. In general, the coherent individual is expected to have a coherent and consistent cultural bias and a stable set of values and preferences (for a comparison with other versions of cultural theory see Table 1.1 on page 16).

3.2. Establishing the Coherent Individual's Cultural Bias

There are several ways to build the four cultural bias categories from the variables chosen in the second chapter. One could compare the averages with each other, but it is not given that the averages are directly comparable; the answers reflect the difficulty of the questions just as much as the level of support. Thus, it is possible that the questions measuring individualism are easier than the questions measuring hierarchy, so that two individuals with comparable support for respectively individualism and hierarchy will score differently in the survey. Assuming that the questions have different levels of difficulty, the proper technique would be to standardize answers to each question and then take the mean of the two questions indicating one cultural bias.[1]

[1] This is a reliable procedure. If there is a difference in the relative spread of the different variables, standardization will even these differences out, which is unfortunate if the differences indicate different levels of cohesion within aÏculture. In addition to the internal cohesion, the degree to which the other cultures oppose the cultural bias in questionÏinfluences the spread, and, in most of the cases, the other cultures are three quarters of the respondents answering aÏquestion. Therefore I believe that the information contained

These individual support levels are then ranked, and the individual assigned membership corresponding to the highest ranking culture, i.e., I use the strongest support for a culture to indicate the dominating cultural bias. There are some problems since the data is on ordinal level. I cannot say with confidence that movement one step higher on the individualism scale is comparable to one step change on the hierarchy scale. Normally, the use of standardized scores requires interval level data, whereas the cultural bias questions are on an ordinal level, but I am willing to assume that the differences are small and will not effect the results substantially.[2]



Figure 3.1: The Relative Sizes of Coherent Cultural Bias Groups

In Figure 3.1 we see that Egalitarianism has the largest number of adherents, Hierarchy and Individualism are equal in size and Fatalism is the smallest group. This fits well with my expectations; Eckstein has described Norway as mostly egalitarian (1966). The social and political atmosphere in Norway has been influenced by labor union strength and the ruling Labor Party for a long period of time. The Labor Party is a social„democratic party and

in the spread is of little or no interest in the CoherentÏIndividual Approach, and standardization can be used without any loss of useful information.

[2] I am going to use this operationalization of the cultural biases throughout the Coherent Individual Approach. The resulting variable is called CULTBIAZ, which stands for cultural bias

social democracy is usually considered to be a regime formed of egalitarians and hierarchists (Grendstad 1990). Thus, it is reasonable to find support for egalitarian and hierarchical values and attitudes in the sample.

The Coherent Individual Approach claims that the individual's cultural bias is **coherent.** If this is so I should find large differences between **the preferred culture** culture that has the highest score on the average of the standardized scores) and the cultures that are **not preferred** (either rejected, indifferent or only weakly preferred). This can be seen in Table 3.1, where mean supports for each of the four cultural scales are compared within each of the four cultural bias categories. It is easy to see that each of these four categories have one mean that is much higher than the others (this is the value that has been the basis for the formation of each of the four cultural categories), and what is significant is that the three other means are considerably lower than the highest one in each group. It is interesting that there is a clear rejection of the other cultural biases in several cases,

Hierarchical Coherent Individuals

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N
EGALITAR	-.19	.80	-2.60	.93	332
FATALISM	-.05	.66	-1.79	1.54	335
INDIVIDU	.01	.60	-1.97	1.33	336
HIERARCH	.83	.55	-.77	1.68	344

Egalitarian Coherent Individuals

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N
INDIVIDU	-.46	.67	-2.34	.81	433
HIERARCH	-.43	.67	-1.80	.87	427
FATALISM	-.25	.53	-1.79	.90	434
EGALITAR	.63	.32	-.47	.93	438

Individualistic Coherent Individuals

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N
EGALITAR	-.52	.91	-2.60	.93	333
FATALISM	-.25	.58	-1.76	1.27	335
HIERARCH	-.23	.66	-1.80	1.27	333
INDIVIDU	.66	.46	-1.16	1.33	339

Fatalistic Coherent Individuals

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N
EGALITAR	-.16	.80	-2.96	.88	278
INDIVIDU	-.10	.62	-2.22	1.33	281
HIERARCH	-.09	.75	-1.80	1.68	278
FATALISM	.78	.59	-.83	2.20	286

Table 3.1: Support for the Rejected Cultural Biases and Coherent Individuals

and that this rejection has a recognizable pattern which fits the theory. All cultures either reject the other cultures, or are at least indifferent about them. I consider levels below an absolute value of 0.1 to be indicating indifference towards a cultural bias. Egalitarians reject Hierarchy and Individualism. Individualists reject Egalitarianism and Fatalism. Hierarchists and Fatalists reject Egalitarianism.

3.2.1. Grendstad's Estimate of the Relative Strengths of the Cultural Biases

To evaluate the effect of an operationalization it is helpful to compare it with an alternative operationalization. The only previous attempt to define the relative sizes, or strengths, of the cultures in Norway is by Gunnar Grendstad (1990, 1995). His estimates of the four cultures' relative sizes can be seen in Table 3.2[3].

He has used the European Value Systems Study Groups' surveys in Norway from 1982 and 1990. The respondents are coded in to the four cultures based on a principal components factor analysis of six questions of social relations that have relevance for cultural theory. The two factors seem to correspond to the grid and group dimensions.

[3] The weighted mean is calculated by me on the basis of Grendstad's estimates for 1982 and 1990.

%	Hierarchy	Individualism	Egalitarianism	Fatalism	N
1982	22.3	26.7	33.0	18.0	1016
1990	28.7	19.6	26.6	25.2	1220
Weighted mean	25.8	22.8	29.5	21.9	2236

Table 3.2 Grendstad's estimates of Cultures Relative Strengths in Norway (1995)

The advantage with Grendstad's approach is that it is closer to the original formulation of the theory, being based on Douglas' (1978) two dimensional grid-group scale. The scales are made of questions related to the discussion of politics, attempts to affect other's opinions, respect for authority, voluntary work, membership in organizations, and loneliness. The answers were factorized (principal component, varimax rotation) from the pooled sample (1982 and 1990, N=2290), and then the respondent was assigned to one of the cultures according to the placement on each of these two factors. The questions seem to be suitable for this purpose, and they perform well on the factor solution, giving a clearly defined grid-group scale. The exception is the question about loneliness, which loads on both the grid and the group dimensions with almost similar values. The presence of the loneliness question might be necessary for the reliable prediction of the fatalists (low grid and low group), but when the question is loading both the grid and the group in a similar manner, the variable hinders the separation of these two dimensions from each other.

The interesting question in this case, though, is to what degree these cultural proportions are a result of the factorization. Does factorization give results that automatically divide the sample into four equally sized cultural categories?

> Whether the factors are orthogonal or not, the factor loadings are the standardized regression coefficients in the multiple regression equation, with the original variable as the dependent variable and the factors as the independent variables. (Norusis 1990, p.B,,132)

We also know that every regression solution goes through the mean of the independent variable[4]. Thus, we can infer that every principal component factor analysis using OLS will place the principal axes as if they were regression lines, therefore they will go through the means of the independent variables - in this case the means of the grid-group variables - which are used to divide the sample into the four cultures. Even if there is a tendency towards equal sizes, there is at least one reason why these two axes do not divide the sample in four equally sized categories: if the variables do not have symmetrical distributions, the individuals are unevenly distributed around the means[5].

I must conclude that Grendstad's factor solution inevitably leads to four categories that tend to be close to each other in size, varying mainly according the unevenness of the distribution.[6] Thus, as a technique, it is prone to underestimate the differences between the strengths of the

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[4] I base this on the general form of the regression where Y is a linear function of the independent variables. There will, of course, be a deviation from the average in the population, but in the sample the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares)Ïsolution will always result in coefficients that place the regression line or plane through the mean of the independentÏvariable. The easiest way to see this is to compare the following to formulas:

$$E(Y_j) = \alpha + \beta_i X_{1j} + \ldots + \beta_{kX_{kj}}$$

$$\mu \equiv \Sigma yp(y) \equiv E(Y)$$

It is easy to see that E(Y) will always be equal to the average of all y observations.

[5] The mechanism is simple: respondents far away from the mean weigh more than respondents close to the mean. In a unsymmetrical distribution the mean does not usually divide the sample in two equal parts.

[6] It should be noted that Grendstad has been using this approach to compare 1980 with 1992, not to estimate the "true" sizes of the cultures.

different cultures in the population. This is by no means a general critique of using factorization, I merely wish to make clear how a statistical technique affects the estimates. These four cultures will always tend to be similar in size if OLS is used, i.e., factorization diminishes differences between the relative strengths. Regardless, the ranking of the relative strengths should be correct.

We can compare Grendstad's solution with my strategy in which membership is based on the standardized averages. My solution allows for a much higher number of respondents to be included in the analysis because the respondents are rejected based on a pairwise deletion of cases instead of listwise deletion, which is common in factor analysis. Standardization evens out the sizes of the groups, but not to the same degree.

valid %	Hierarchy	Individualism	Egalitarianism	Fatalism
My Estimate	24,4	24,1	31,1	20,3
Weighted mean of 1982 and 1990 from Grendstad	25,8	22,8	29,5	21,9

Table 3.3 A Comparison of Grendstad's and My Estimates of the Relative Sizes of the Cultures

Comparing these two different operationalizations we can see that the results are fairly similar (Table 3.3). Even if the operationalizations behind the estimates are very different, it is encouraging to find that the ranking of the relative strengths of the cultures is the same in both approaches. We both estimated that Egalitaranism received the most support followed by Hierarchy, and then Individualism. We both

estimated Fatalismleast supported group. The differences between the estimates are minor even though I tried to use a method of categorization that would reflect the true sizes better than factorization. Either the factorization, despite its relative character gave good estimates, or my standardization of the variables leads to a similar diminishing of differences. Ì

3.3. The Coherent Individual and Social Background

To understand a social phenomenon it is important to see how it relates to other social phenomena. Since cultural theory - and especially my way of operationalization which is based on cultural bias - is a new approach, I have chosen to present some of the most commonly used and also best known background characteristics: age, educational level, and social position. By showing the coherent individual's background I can either strengthen or weaken this operationalization.

The three versions of cultural theory differ from each other with the aspect of learning. In my data there is no direct way of measuring how individuals learn, but by examining age (learning through life experience) and education (learning in school) it is possible to get a vague picture of learning. If both age and education are combined with the different social positions I am in a better position to judge between the three versions of cultural theory.

The authors of Cultural Theory do not specify any significant differences based on age and educational level (perhaps on type, but not on level).

The theory claims that cultural biases are dependent on grid„group, so that any significant patterns based on age, education and social position should be traceable, if at all possible, back to the grid-group position.

3.3.1. Age

Coherent individuals are not supposed to differ from each other based on age alone, but if we consider the changes our society has gone through in the last 50 years, it seems inevitable that different generations have been affected by different experiences[7]. In Table 3.4 we see how age and cultural bias are related to each other. We can see that there are indeed differences in the mean age of the different cultural biases. Individualists and egalitarians are the youngest, and fatalists and hierarchists are the oldest. The difference in the average of the youngest and the oldest group is almost seven years, which is considerable. F-test shows that the relationship is also statistically significant. The relationship, though, is only moderate strength - Eta2 is 0.17. The proportion of explained variance is thus low (Eta2 of 0.03).

It seems reasonable to assume that there are respondents of all different ages in each of the cultural bias groups, which will create a large variation within the groups. Thus interpreted, differences in the average age

[7] Theoretically it is possible to imagine a situation of change in society without a change in grid„group positions or cultural biases, but this seems quite far fetched for the Norwegian case. The society has moved away from a moreÏhierarchical position in families, corporations and other organizations, and towards a regime of Egalitarianism andÏHierarchy in the state and a regime of Individualism and Hierarchy in the corporative world (Grendstad 1995). TheseÏare, of course, only general tendencies, and give only crude descriptions of the actual situation.

Dependent Variable AGE
By levels of CULTBIAZ Cultbias from Z cultmeans

Within Groups Total	41,5	16,76	394106,03	1407	
Source	Sum of Squares	Mean d.f.	Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	11626,5	3	3875,5	13,8	,0000
Within Groups	394106,0	1403	280,9		

Table 3.4: Age and the Coherent Individuals' Cultural Bias

reflect the different age composition of the cultural bias groups, and the high variation within groups (causing low Eta2) is a natural phenomena.[8][

Given these results I can with confidence conclude that there are significant differences in the mean ages for the respondents supporting different cultures. The most likely interpretation seems to be that Hierarchy and Fatalism are not effected by age itself, but that cultural biases are unevenly distributed among the different generations.

To pursue this further I have made a table with three age groups and the four cultures (Table 3.5), where we can see that the different age groups do differ from each other regarding the ratio of people from the different cultures. There is a clear tendency for more respondents aged 30 years and below, or between 30 and 60, to be individualistic or egalitarian,

[8] This will make the ratio of explained and unexplained variance small, in any case, i.e., we should not expect a high Eta2



THREE AGE GROUPS

Col Pct / Adj Res	< 30 younger	30-50 middle	>50 older	Row Total
CULTBIAZ				
egalitar	34,9%	33,8%	23,6%	438
	2,0	1,8	-3,9	31,1%
fatalism	18,3%	18,3%	25,1%	286
	-1,2	-1,5	2,9	20,3%
hierarch	20,4%	21,9%	32,0%	344
	-2,4	-1,8	4,3	24,5%
individu	26,4%	25,9%	19,3%	339
	1,3	1,3	-2,7	24,1%
Column Total	436 31,0%	556 39,5%	415 29,5%	1407 100,0%

Approximate Statistic	Value	Significance
Cramer's V	,11479	,00000 *1
Goodman & Kruskal Tau :		
with CULTBIAZ dependent	,00907	,00000 *2
with AGEGRP dependent	,01236	,00000 *2

Number of Missing Observations: 7

Table 3.5 Three Age Groups and Coherent Individuals

while fewer in these age groups are hierarchical. For the oldest group - over 60 years - there is a strong tendency for more hierarchical and a moderate tendency for fewer individualistic or egalitarian respondents. This fits well with the idea of coherent individuals, who keep their cultural bias over a long period of time. The older generation, being socialized in a different society, has a different outlook on the world. This is not a problem for the theory of surprise either, since it is common to assume that all cultures are present in society.

3.3.2. Education

Education per se should not be directly related to individuals' cultures, but to the degree education and social relations do covariate some relation should be expected. Hierarchy is often connected to what is considered a traditional way of organizing society, therefore I would expect the hierarchists to be both older and to have less education than the others. I would also expect fatalists to have a lower level of education than the others, since education can be considered as a personal resource, making it less likely to be a fatalist. Thus, I believe that having education can

EDUCYEAR Education in years

Value Label	Mean	Std Dev	Sum of Sq	Cases
egalitar	12,65	3,41	4749,00	409
fatalism	11,50	3,19	2507,00	247
hierarch	11,45	3,19	3029,25	299
individu	12,68	2,96	2762,72	316
Within Groups Total	12,15	3,21	13047,96	1271

Source	Sum of Squares	d.f.	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	440,92	3	146,97	14,27	,0000
Within Groups	13047,96	1267	10,30		

Table 3.6 Level of Education and the Coherent Individual's Cultural Bias

Influence one to become egalitarian or individualistic more often than hierarchical or fatalistic. These expectations are confirmed in Table 3.6. We can see that hierarchists and fatalists generally have lower levels of education than egalitarians and individualists. One should also notice that the differences between the different cultures' educational levels are small, even if the relationship is statistically significant. Thus, the relation between education and cultural bias is as expected, both when it

comes to the patterns and the magnitude of the differences found in the analyses[9].

3.3.3. Social Position

Cultural theory postulates that one's cultural bias is a result of one's social relations. It is impossible to say anything precise about grid and group positions based on information about an individual's social position. Social positions is here understood as a respondent's means of support, which has perhaps become the most important indicator of one's position in relation to others in society (see footnote for a operationalization). It seems reasonable to assume that the relative number of supporters of each cultural bias will differ from one social position to another. Thus I am looking both for deviations in general and for deviations that have a pattern that either support or weaken the Coherent Individual Approach.

There is no clear,,cut rule describing how different social positions coincide with different cultures. It is probably possible for any of the social positions to organize social relations according to any of the four cultures, but I would expect social positions and cultural biases to show some common variation.

[9] It would be interesting to look at the different types of education and the differences between the strengths of cultures, but that would require an analysis of the content of the different educations, which I unfortunately have had toÏleave out. There would also be the issue of cause and effect. Do people choose a specific education because theyÏbelong to a culture, or does a certain education change individuals' cultural bias? There are many interesting questionsÏwhich my data cannot adequately answer.

Social Position	egalitar	fatalism	hierarch	individu	n
Unskilled labor	6,8%	11,2%	7,8%	6,4%	107
Skilled labor	4,7%	5,1%	4,5%	5,5%	67
Office unskilled	8,2%	6,5%	6,6%	7,9%	101
Office school	6,5%	5,8%	4,2%	8,8%	87
Office college	19,2%	14,5%	11,1%	17,0%	215
Office univers.	8,2%	4,3%	5,4%	7,6%	90
Agriculture,fish.	,5%	2,5%	2,7%	1,8%	24
Selfemployed	3,3%	3,6%	4,8%	4,2%	54
Unklassified job	4,0%	2,5%	7,5%	3,9%	62
Retired	10,3%	15,2%	20,1%	9,1%	183
Student	16,6%	11,6%	8,1%	16,7%	185
Pension,Unempl.	5,4%	13,4%	9,3%	5,8%	110
Work at home	6,5%	3,6%	8,1%	5,5%	83

Table 3.7 Coherent Individual's Social Position in Column %

In Table 3.7 we can see how the different cultures are represented in different social positions. The respondents with a job are classified according to sector (agriculture, fishing, different types of labor), according to manual vs. non,,manual labor (labor vs. different types of office work), according to different levels of qualifications needed (non,,skilled, skilled, different levels of education required), self employed, and unclassified jobs[10]. In addition we are supplied with information about the respondents who are not currently working; they are retired, still in school, unemployed, pensioned, or working at home. The differences I am expecting to find are that the unemployed and the pensioned have the highest number of fatalists among them, the self,,employed have a high number of individualists and low number of fatalists, the skilled laborers should be less fatalistic than unskilled,

[10] This variable is based on the *Standard for Norsk Statistikk* (SNS 5) variable "social position", which is a combination of main occupation, sectors of production, manual/non,,manual labor, and the different qualificationsÏrequired for the job. It combines many different aspects of social position into one typology, which of course makes itÏdifficult to use for measuring culture.

retired people have a high number of hierarchists, and students have a high number of egalitarians and individualists.

SOCIAL POSITION	egalitar	fatalism	hierarch	individu	Row
Unskil.labor	-1,0	**2,4**	,0	-1,1	107
Skilled labor	-,3	,2	-,4	,5	67
Office unskill	,8	-,6	-,6	,4	101
Office school	,2	-,4	-1,9	**2,1**	87
Office college	**2,4**	-,6	**-2,7**	,7	215
Office Univers.	1,6	-1,7	-1,0	,8	90
Agric.Fish.	**-2,4**	1,1	1,5	,1	24
Self empl.	-,9	-,3	,9	,3	54
Unclass.job	-,7	-1,8	**3,0**	-,6	62
Retired	**-2,3**	1,0	**4,1**	**-2,6**	183
Student	**2,2**	-1,0	**-3,3**	1,9	185
Pension,Unempl	**-2,4**	**3,7**	1,0	-1,8	110
Homework.	,5	-1,9	1,8	-,5	83
Column	428	276	334	330	1368
Total	31,3%	20,2%	24,4%	24,1%	100%

Table 3.8 Social Position and Coherent Individual's Cultural Bias in Adjusted Residuals

If we look at Table 3.8, we can see the coherent individual's deviation from the expected social position in adjusted residuals[11]. There are some very clear deviations visible, and I have emphasized cells that deviate more than two adjusted residuals from the expected. As expected, the unskilled labor does have a higher number of fatalists. Among the people working in agriculture and fishing there is a relatively low number of egalitarians, and a somewhat higher number of hierarchists and

[11] The adjusted standardized residuals are standardized residuals that are adjusted for the expected value in that cell; i.e., the expected frequency. These calculations are robust and not dependent on the number of respondents in the cell. The adjusted residuals are calculated as

$$Adj.\mathrm{Re}s. = \frac{f_{ij} - E_{ij}}{\sqrt{E_{ij}(1-\frac{r_i}{N})(1-\frac{c_j}{N})}}$$

Where f_{ij} is the frequency in the cell ij, E_{ij} is the expected frequency for the same cell, r_i is the row subtotal, c_j is the column subtotal, N is the total number of respondents in the table. (SPSS,,manual, *Algorithms*, p.61-62)

fatalists. The Unclassified do show a tendency to be hierarchists, which could be explained by the inclusion of military personnel in this category. Among retired people there is a high number of hierarchists and low number of egalitarians and individualists. Students show the opposite pattern, and have a high number of egalitarian and individualists and a low of hierarchists. Respondents who are pensioned or unemployed show the highest tendency towards Fatalism, and a tendency away from Egalitarianism and Individualism. Earlier I showed that there are many fatalists among the oldest age group (see discussion on page 74). This tendency towards fatalism could be related to either age or social position.

	CULTBIAZ				
	Col Pct / Adj Res				Row
SOCLPOSI	egalitar	fatalism	hierarch	individu	Total
1,00 working	14,3% / -,1	10,7% / -,9	12,4% / -,7	25,0% / 2,1	35 / 14,5%
3,00 retired	75,0% / ,4	71,4% / -,3	71,9% / -,3	75,0% / ,3	176 / 73,0%
4,00 sos.support	5,4% / -,4	14,3% / 2,6	5,6% / -,5	,0% / -1,8	16 / 6,6%
5,00 work home	5,4% / ,1	,0% / -2,0	10,1% / 2,8	,0% / -1,6	12 / 5,0%
7,00 other	,0% / -,8	3,6% / 2,6	,0% / -1,1	,0% / -,6	2 / ,8%
Column Total	56 / 23,2%	56 / 23,2%	89 / 36,9%	40 / 16,6%	241 / 100,0%

Statistic	Value	ASE1	Val/ASE0	Approximate Significance
Cramer's V	,20			,006
Lambda :				
symmetric	,023	,018	1,30	
with SOCLPOSI dependent	,000	,000		
with CULTBIAZ dependent	,033	,025	1,30	
Goodman & Kruskal Tau :				

Table 3.9 Social Position and Coherent Individuals
for respondents older than 60 years

In Table 3.9 we can see how social position influences cultural identity for the respondents who are over 60 years. It seems clear that social position has an effect independent of age, and the effect that age has in Table 3.3 can be a result of the correlation between age and social position. Since only respondents who are over 60 years are included in the subsample, the social position with the largest number of respondents is the retired. For the retired, the number of people belonging to each culture is fairly even, and the distribution of the respondents supporting different cultural biases does not have any strong deviations from the expected frequencies. This seems to contradict the hypothesis of social position having effects on cultural bias. The groups consisting of the unemployed and those receiving social support[12] have a higher number of fatalists among them, as expected. The respondents who are still working are more often individualists than the other groups. The measures of the strength of the association also indicate that social position influences cultural identity - and not the opposite. The influence is weak, though, perhaps because social position is not a direct measure of grid-group position.

There indeed seems to be a pattern of cultural biases that fits with the general images we have about the different social positions. In addition, even if the connection between cultural biases and grid-group dimensions appears to be present, I have not been able to substantiate this; social positions do not necessarily correspond to only one grid-group position.

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[12] It should be noted that the respondents were asked 'How would you currently categorize yourself? As a...' This will undoubtedly have an effect on support for fatalism. I expect that the people who are fatalists are more likely to **identify themselves** as living on social support, whereas people with other cultural biases are more likely to pick a more active image of themselves, such as working at home or simply retired. Therefore it is difficult to use the results based on thisÏquestion to support the causal direction.

Therefore, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 should be understood as describing groups defined by social position and not as referring to some kind of hidden grid-group position.

To summarize, support for the different cultures varies with age group. The different cultures also exhibit slightly different average levels of education (the differences in the educational level can at least partly be explained by the older generations' lower educational level). Further, cultures differ according to the respondents' social positions in a manner that fits the theory; when social position is controlled for high age, the effect age had on fatalism practically disappears. The result indicates that social position is a more important explanatory factor than age or education. I have not made a connection between grid-group and cultural bias, but I have shown that cultural bias behaves as expected in relation to some important background variables, enforcing my belief in a successful operationalization.

3.4. Party Preference and The Coherent Individual

I shall here look at how the coherent individual's party preference is related to cultural bias, and compare my results with Grendstad's results (1995).

3.4.1. Party Preference and The Coherent Individual in 1993

All the respondents were asked to answer the question, "Which party would you vote for if there were a parliamentary election today?" Table

3.10 gives a description of the cultural composition of the different parties' supporters - this helps us to place the parties in the cultural landscape, but reveals little about causality[13]. The different cultures demonstrate different patterns of party preference, and the differences are statistically significant. Therefore, I can safely conclude that there is a relation between coherent individuals' cultural biases and their party preferences. One can immediately see that a high proportion of RV and SV's supporters are egalitarians, and that H and Frp have a high

Col Pct	PARTY PREFERENCE RV	SV	DNA	Sp	V	Krf	H	Frp	Other	DontKnow	Wontvote	N / %
CULTBIAZ												
egalitar	72,7	60,8	34,9	30,7	43,5	31,0	12,4	9,7	15,4	28,6	26,6	420 31,2
fatalism	18,2	17,7	18,0	26,8	13,0	16,7	12,0	23,6	53,8	23,3	31,6	269 20,0
hierarch		12,9	31,3	22,0	21,7	35,7	26,2	27,8	15,4	23,3	20,3	328 24,4
individu	9,1	8,6	15,8	20,5	21,7	16,7	49,4	38,9	15,4	24,9	21,5	328 24,4
Column N	11	186	272	127	23	84	233	72	13	245	79	1345
Total %	,8	13,8	20,2	9,4	1,7	6,2	17,3	5,4	1,0	18,2	5,9	100,0

Statistic	Value	ASE1	Approximate Val/ASE0	Significance
Cramer's V	= ,25			,00000
Lambda with CULTBIAZ dependent	= ,13	,017	7,18	

Table 3.10 The Coherent Indivuduals and Party Preference, Column %

proportion of individualists among their supporters[14]. I prefer to use adjusted residuals to study the effect of being a coherent individual with a

[13] I have chosen to present Table 3.10 like this in order to make a comparison with Grendstad's results possible, and to give a description , which I believe is useful before we begin analyzing the effects cultures have on voting.

[14] Only 11 respondents prefer RV. This is too low for making any inferences about the population. I have decided to include it in the discussion because it is the most radical party in Norway and very different from the other parties. TheÏRV voters' cultural bias differ considerably from that of all the other parties' voters'. I

particular bias, because directly show how much the cultural bias changes the party preference from the average.

The variable CULTBIAZ determines the respondents' culture by comparing means of the standardized cultural bias questions, and labels the respondent according the cultural bias on which it has the highest value. The sizes for each of the cultural biases indicated by this variable are fairly similar to Grendstad's factor solution. But when the table is presented with adjusted residuals, as in Table 3.11, we see a different picture. I will first present my results and then compare them with Grendstad's results.

Adj Res	PARTYPRF											
CULTBIAZ	RV	SV	DNA	Sp	V	Krf	H	Frp	Other	Dont Know	Wont vote	N
hierarch	-1,9	-3,9	3,0	-,6	-,3	2,5	,7	,7	-,8	-,5	-,9	328
individu	-1,2	-5,4	-3,7	-1,1	-,3	-1,7	9,8	2,9	-,8	,2	-,6	328
egalitar	3,0	9,4	1,5	-,1	1,3	-,1	-6,8	-4,0	-1,2	-1,0	-,9	420
fatalism	-,2	-,8	-,9	2,0	-,8	-,8	-3,4	,8	3,1	1,4	2,7	269
Column N	11	186	272	127	23	84	233	72	13	245	79	1345

Number of Missing Observations: 69

Table 3.11 Cultural Bias and Party Preferece, adj. res. 1993

The **hierarchists** display a clear tendency towards Krf and DNA, both which can be characterized as having traditional hierarchical profiles. Parties that do not get the hierarchists' support are SV and RV, which is

believe that this is not aÏcoincidence, and I am willing to accept the uncertainty involved with the low number of RV voters in order to be able toÏillustrate the theory while including an extreme party's supporters.

also plausible, as both of these parties are at least somewhat radical - hoping to change society - and they promote equality of result[15].

Individualists also show a tendency to dislike RV and SV, but they add one more party to the list, DNA, which advocates increased state involvement in peoples' lives. Additionally, the individualists exhibit a positive inclination towards H and Frp, the two right-wing parties in Norway.

The **egalitarians** display a very strong tendency to vote for SV - a whole 9.4 adjusted standard deviations from the expected. This is the strongest effect in this table. Another party that egalitarians seem to prefer is RV, but the magnitude of the effect in only a third of that which SV is subject to[16]. Being egalitarian negatively impacts the vote for H and Frp. For all the other parties the effects are small or moderate.

The **fatalists** behave as expected, showing a tendency either to not to know whom to vote for or to refuse to vote at all. The tendency towards non„voting is the strongest one for fatalists. Only Sp clearly profits from the fatalist bias. What is it in this agrarian party that is so attractive to the fatalists?[17] Fatalists also exhibit a slight tendency towards Frp, which could be explained by the attention Frp gives to - the regular people -, believing they are subject to too many life-obstructing rules. Even if this argument sounds individualistic (in its reference to rules), I find it plausible that the emphasis Frp places on ordinary people is attractive to

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[15] This is a certain type of equality. See Grendstad 1993 for more details.

[16] One reason why SV gets a higher adj. res. is the difference in the number of RV and SV voters.

[17] Political science does not yet understand the fatalists as well as the other cultures. The "non„political" individuals have quite often been defined as outside of our field of study.

some fatalists. The parties for which fatalists display the strongest negative tendency are SV, H, and RV. Both SV and RV emphasize the individual's moral responsibility to act politically, which explains the fatalists disinclination to support these two parties.

3.4.2. Party Preference and Cultural Bias by Grendstad (1995)

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Grendstad has presented an estimation of the relative sizes of the cultural followership in general and for the different parties' supporters (Grendstad 1995). In Table 3.12, an excerpt of Grendstad's original table, we can see the cultural biases of the different parties' supporters[18].

1990 Column %	SV	DNA	SP	V	Krf	H	Frp	Other	Missing	Total
Hierarchy	13,5	28,5	28,3	28,6	42,3	22,3	26,4	16,7	28,8	26,6
Individualism	42,1	28,8	23,3	31,4	16,7	29,4	29,6	33,3	25,2	28,7
Egalitarianism	33,3	19,6	31,7	28,6	30,8	28,9	24,8	41,7	21,2	25,2
Fatalism	11,1	23,1	16,7	11,4	10,3	19,3	19,2	8,3	24,8	19,6
n	126	337	60	35	78	197	125	12	250	1220

Table 3.12 Cultural Biases and Party Preference from Grendstad

We can see how hierarchists tend to vote more often for Krf and DNA and, more often than the other cultures, they end up in the category 'Missing'[19]. There is also a strong tendency among the hierarchists not to

[18] The original table from which this excerpt and recalculation is from can be found in Grendstad 1995, pp. 228,,229.

[19] This category includes the people who did not vote, who did not know what to vote for, and who did not answer the question.

vote for H and SV. The **Individualists** show an equally strong tendency to support SV. Individualists also prefer V and Other parties, and a slightly lesser inclination for H and Frp. Parties not in favor among the individualists are Krf and Sp. Among **egalitarians** the most favored party is SV. This does not mean that SV is the most supported party among the egalitarians, only that the distribution of egalitarians votes deviates from the expected more towards SV than any of the other parties. I am focusing on the effect a cultural bias has on the expected voting pattern, not on the actual sizes of the parties. Egalitarians' second most preferred party is, surprisingly, H. The largest negative deviation for the egalitarians is, also surprisingly, for DNA and Frp. When measuring, what kind of effect egalitarian bias has on voting we thus find positive effects for SV and H and negative for DNA and Frp. This is worrisome as the influence of the egalitarian and individualistic biases should be relevant in determining the left,,right position of the parties[20] - yet here the egalitarians' voting preference is quite inconsistent in relation to the left-right position. With **fatalist** the 'Missing' category is over-represented, as expected. Next on their ranking is DNA, which could be consistent with fatalists' cultural bias; it is easy to imagine fatalists frequently voting for the ruling party just because it is the largest party, and because they believe that voting for other parties would be ineffective. Parties which have a under-representation of fatalist votes are SV, Krf, V, and Sp, in this order. To sum up, the relationship between distribution of votes and cultural bias does fit somewhat with cultural

[20] See Grendstad (1990) and Selle & Grendstad (1994) But the unexpected performance can also be a result of the over-simplicity of a uni-dimensional left-right scale.

theory, with the exception of the egalitarian cultural bias, which does not seem to behave as it should.

It might be an misinterpretation on my part to read Grendstad's results as referring to the relative strengths of the cultural biases, since the table in Grendstad (1995) was intended to study change from 1982 to 1990. But, even if factorization is a relative technique, the results should bear enough similarities to allow comparison with each other. My and Grendstad's presentations of cultural theory's relation to party preference differ from each other substantially. Some of the cultural biases have dissimilar effects on party preference. These discrepancies are not likely to be caused only by time as only three years passed between the times surveys were taken. Additionally, some of the differences are quite conside,rable; like the strong positive tendency egalitarians showed in their preference for H in 1990, which is in strong contrast to the situation in 1993 when egalitarians showed a strong negative tendency for H. The main difference between these two presentations is in the questions used in the surveys, and in the construction of the scale used to measure the cultures. I believe that the questions used in 1993, being tailored for measurement of cultural bias[21], are a better indicator of cultures than the questions about social relations used in 1990. Also, the principal components factorization used on the 1990 survey divide the sample into four fairly equally-sized groups. In particular, the difficulty in interpreting the egalitarian group's pattern of preferences in 1990 is disturbing. I am inclined to trust the table from 1993 more because the parties exhibit

[21] The Norwegian questions are translated and adapted to local context by Gunnar Grendstad, based on Karl Dake's questions in English made for the U.S. public.

patterns that fit the popular images the parties have, and the voting pattern for all four cultural biases seems to fit smoothly to the theory, with the only exception being that fatalists show preference for Sp.

3.5. Summary

The Coherent Individual approach does have some empirical support. The sizes of the cultures were fairly similar in both my and in Grendstad's (1995) operationalizations. There is some uncertainty involved in the content of the cultural bias categories as to whether they refer to what they are supposed to. There is, though, evidence showing that the content of the cateories fits the theory. Respondents can be placed into the four cultures, and the four cultures differ from each other regarding age, education, social position and party preference. It is difficult to distinguish the individual effects of age, education and social position on the relative strengths of the cultural biases, but in general the patterns found support the theoretical perspective. This increases my confidence in the operationalization of cultural biases.

The content of the cultural bias categories can best be observed through the biases' effects on party preference. The four cultures have very clear effects on party preference, as anticipated by cultural theory. Hierarchists show a tendency to prefer DNA and Krf, and not prefer SV and RV. Individualists show a tendency to prefer H and Frp, and not prefer DNA and SV. Egalitarians show a tendency to prefer SV and RV, and prefer H and Frp. Fatalists show a tendency to prefer parties listed under -Other- or they would not vote, and they show a tendency not to prefer H.

The Coherent Individual Approach has shown that the operationalization of cultural biases, on the basis of the eight questions, can successfully to analyze party preference.

FIGURES:

Figure 3.1 The Relative Sizes of Coherent Cultural Bias Groups

TABLES: